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Abstract 
In this paper I seek to defend an epistemology that does not confine itself 
to the knowledge of propositions. The first section motivates this move, 
especially from the standpoint of the philosophy of science. The second section 
presents the notion of operational coherence as the key to understanding how 
knowledge resides in activities. The third section presents a proposal for making 
sense of truth on the basis of operational coherence. The final section briefly re-
considers the relation between knowledge-as-ability and knowledge-as-
information. 
1. Knowledge beyond propositions 
The overall direction of this paper is to move beyond the propositional 
conception of knowledge.  What I mean by that phrase is the widespread notion 
that knowledge (or at least the kind of knowledge that deserves the attention of 
epistemologists) consists in possessing the right sort of belief in the right sort of 
propositions.2  Without denying the importance of propositional knowledge, I 
want to pay attention to other aspects of what we commonly call knowledge, 
which cannot comfortably be fitted into a propositional framework.  I will not 
pretend that the move I am making is a novel one, especially in this journal.  
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After all, it was in a Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society that Gilbert 
Ryle (1900–1976) presented his distinction between “knowing that” and 
“knowing how” and stressed the independence and importance of the latter 
(Ryle 1945/46; also Ryle 1949, chapter 2); that work was discussed relatively 
recently in another Presidential Address by Paul Snowdon (2004), though in a 
critical light.  And “knowing how” and “knowing that” are not all the only kinds of 
knowledge, either, if we pursue a line of thought that Snowdon (2004, p. 5) 
mentions and discards.  To every kind of question “Do you know…” corresponds 
a different kind of knowledge.  So there is not only knowing-how and knowing-
that, but also knowing-why (having a causal or intentional explanation for 
something), knowing-what/who (recognition of another being), knowing 
someone or something (acquaintance), knowing-what-it’s-like (empathetic 
understanding), and more types besides. 
It is not my intention in this paper to enter deeply into the ongoing debate 
as to whether “knowing how” is really only a species of “knowing that”.  For now, 
I only beg acceptance that it is an important and meaningful thing to say that “I 
know how to do X” (I imagine that there are roughly equivalent expressions in 
most languages), and that it should not be taken for granted that knowledge as 
the ability to do things is inferior or subordinate to knowledge as information 
storage and retrieval.  I believe that distinguishing between knowledge-as-ability 
and knowledge-as-information is a cogent way of expressing what Ryle was 
trying to get at by his distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that.  
It also allows us to bypass a main line of critique of Ryle, articulated by Jason 
Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001), which rests on denying that knowledge-
how is about ability.  Knowledge-how as Stanley and Williamson take it, which 
consists in descriptions of how something is done, may well be a species of 
knowledge-that.  What I want to talk about, which I believe Ryle was also 
concerned with, is an agent’s mental and physical functioning in bringing that 
something about.  In this regard Snowdon’s (2004, p. 7) distinction between 
“knowing how” and “knowing how to” is a helpful first step, though he then 
rather unhelpfully lumps “how to” together with other infinitive constructions 
such as “when to” and “where to”. 
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Somehow the direction of epistemology pioneered by Ryle and his fellow-
travellers such as J. L. Austin (1911–1960), not to mention the later Wittgenstein, 
has become sidelined in the mainstream of analytic philosophy, a tradition which 
they had themselves done much to establish.3  There are various good reasons 
for a return to this line of work, which many philosophers have attempted.  My 
own particular motivations are rooted in the needs of the philosophy of science, 
rather than epistemology or other branches of philosophy.  In this context it is 
interesting to note that Alfred Senier, the first Secretary of the Aristotelian 
Society and the man who initially conceived the idea of the society, was a 
scientist — by profession an analytical chemist, rather than an analytical 
philosopher.  As H. Wildon Carr put it in his 50-year retrospective on the Society 
in 1929: “The ideal of the Aristotelian Society is the study of philosophy not as an 
academical subject but as the story of human thinking.”4  The “story of human 
thinking” in the modern times must surely include the story of scientific 
knowledge.  And my sense is that knowledge-as-ability is just as important in 
science as in everyday life, though Ryle’s and Austin’s examples tended to be 
taken from everyday life. 
To get our intuitions going, let’s consider briefly some examples of the 
sort of things that we should want to know in science, in addition to cut-and-
dried facts.  Here again it is instructive to take heed of Ryle’s insight (1945/46, p. 
15): “The advance of knowledge does not consist only in the accumulation of 
discovered truths, but also and chiefly in the cumulative mastery of methods.”  In 
advancing scientific knowledge, we should want to know how to analyze a 
complex organic molecule to ascertain its molecular composition and structure.  
And we want to known how to learn and teach such a skill.  We want to know not 
only the trajectory of a planet, but how to compute it, which involves knowing 
how to solve the equations of the basic physics involved; we also want to know 
how to come up with such equations in the first place.  We want to know how to 
measure temperature and humidity, the rate of inflation, and the level of well-
being of a population.  We want to know how to synthesize a new 
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pharmaceutical agent, and how to assess its clinical efficacy.  We want to know 
how to make a superconductor that will operate above the temperature of liquid 
nitrogen.  We want to know how to sequence a DNA molecule; how to run a 
Monte Carlo simulation of an experiment we can’t carry out physically; how to 
model a complex situation as a causal graph; etc, etc.  We should want to have an 
epistemology that can address these items of knowledge-as-ability directly, 
rather than skirting around them in an awkward and round-about way, treating 
them as the applications of propositions that we believe, or as inessential 
accompaniments to propositions. 
Another source of motivation for getting away from the propositional 
conception of knowledge is the work of Thomas Kuhn and others who took a 
serious historical look at the development of scientific knowledge.  Philosophers 
had usually conceived the task of judgement facing scientists as the problem of 
“theory-choice”, but Kuhn showed quite convincingly that scientists’ choice at the 
most crucial moments in the history of science was between entire paradigms, 
rather than merely theories.  What exactly Kuhn meant by “paradigm” was 
famously debatable, but at least it had to be admitted that a paradigm contained 
particular methods of work and criteria of judgements, as well as straightforward 
descriptive statements.  Theory-choice came to be seen to be inextricably linked 
to, and essentially dependent on, choices concerning non-propositional aspects 
of science.  This is at the heart of the Kuhnian incommensurability problem, 
more important than its semantic aspect.  Whether or not one agrees with 
everything Kuhn says, it has to be admitted that the unit of analysis employed in 
philosophy of science must include something beyond propositions. 
In previous publications I have proposed that scientific work (as well as 
non-scientific but knowledge-related aspects of living) can be analyzed in terms 
of “epistemic activities” and “systems of practice”, in conscious opposition to the 
more customary analysis of scientific knowledge as consisting of propositions 
(Chang 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2014).  I defined an epistemic activity as “a more-or-
less coherent set of mental or physical operations that are intended to contribute 
to the production or improvement of knowledge in a particular way, in 
accordance with some discernible rules (though the rules may be 
unarticulated).”  Epistemic activities normally do not, and should not, occur in 
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isolation.  Rather, each one tends to be practiced in relation to others, 
constituting a whole system.  A scientific system of practice is “formed by a 
coherent set of epistemic activities performed with a view to achieve certain 
aims” (Chang 2014, p. 72; Chang 2012, pp. 15–16).  Let me illustrate briefly with 
an example: Antoine Lavoisier created a new system of chemistry whose main 
activities included making various chemical reactions including those involving 
gases, tracking chemical substances through weight-measurement, classifying 
compounds according to their compositions, and analyzing organic substances 
by combustion. The overall aims of this system included determining the 
composition of various substances, and explaining chemical reactions in terms of 
the composition of the substances.  
The linchpin in this whole way of thinking turns out to be the notion of 
coherence, whose meaning I have left quite vague in previous publications.  It is 
the main thing I want to elaborate on in the rest of this paper.  Coherence as I 
intend it goes beyond consistency between propositions; rather, it consists in 
various actions coming together in an effective way towards the achievement of 
one’s aims.  Coherence comes in degrees and different shapes, and it is 
necessarily a less precise concept than consistency, which comes well-defined 
through logical axioms.  An important part of my proposal is to keep in mind the 
aims that scientists are trying to achieve in each and every situation. The 
presence and operation of an identifiable aim is what distinguishes actions from 
mere physical happenings involving human bodies, and it is also what places 
knowledge firmly in the realm of actions. 
2. Correspondence vs. coherence 
According to the standard propositional conception of knowledge, 
knowing something is a matter of mentally possessing propositions that 
correspond to the world.  This picture embodies an ideal of knowledge focused 
on correspondence, which is impossible actually to approach.  First of all, the idea 
is liable to be based on a category mistake.  Otto Neurath put the point succinctly 
([1931] 1983, p. 66): “Statements are compared with statements, not with 
'experiences', not with a 'world' nor with anything else.”  Hilary Putnam makes a 
complementary point (1995, p. 10): “To say that truth is ‘correspondence to 
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reality’ is not false but empty, as long as nothing is said about what the 
‘correspondence’ is. If the ‘correspondence’ is supposed to be utterly 
independent of the ways in which we confirm the assertions we make . . . then 
the ‘correspondence’ is an occult one, and our supposed grasp of it is also occult.”  
Austin tried to discern a plain and untroublesome sense in which statements 
correspond to facts, but the nature of the correspondence remained unclear 
(unless one subscribed to the notion that the world actually consisted of facts).  
In the end he considered statement–fact correspondence a conventional pairing, 
not any kind of resemblance (Austin [1950] 1979, pp. 121-126).  The Tarski 
disquotation scheme does not save us here: it makes sense as a matter of 
relationship between two languages (or language and meta-language), or 
tautologically as a relationship within one language; either way, it says nothing 
about how statement and fact (or world) might relate. 
It must be admitted that we have no access to the “external” world, except 
through the statements that we regard as true.  Seeking statement–world 
correspondence is not an operable move, unless it is a circular–tautological 
move: we say that we access the world through our possession of true 
statements, and that true statements are just those that give us access to the 
world.5  This inoperability of the propositional ideal of knowledge as 
correspondence gives rise to some well-known problems in the philosophy of 
science.  At least since Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, first 
published in 1962, philosophy of science has been plagued by doubts about the 
security of scientific knowledge — not global skeptical doubts, but practical 
doubts that manifest themselves concerning actual situations of scientific choice.  
While we uphold science as the best model of knowledge, we are also forced to 
admit, if we pay any attention to the history of science, that scientific change has 
shown no clear direction concerning the fundamental ontology of nature.  Our 
optimism concerning scientific progress is dampened down by the “pessimistic 
induction” from the history of science, in which it is seen that nearly all 
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previously trusted theories are later rejected (Laudan 1981).  The pursuit of 
correspondence-truth leads us either to an epistemic dead end, or a comforting 
yet empty tautology. 
In the alternative epistemological vision that I seek to promote, 
knowledge is closely related to our ability to perform successful activities.  It is in 
order to facilitate the analysis of activities and their successes, that I introduce 
the notion of “coherence”.  It will not do to say that an activity is successful 
because it somehow corresponds correctly to the world.  An activity we perform 
resides in the world, the same world in which we live; they do not discernibly 
correspond to the “external world”, whatever one might mean by the latter 
phrase.  A more productive perspective is to see that an activity works out 
because, roughly speaking, what goes into it all fits together nicely. It is 
important to note that coherence as I intend it is about the harmoniousness of 
actions, not primarily about the logical relationship between propositions.  To 
mark that point clearly, I will use the phrase “operational coherence” whenever 
needed, and just “coherence” when the meaning should be clear enough from 
context.6 
Somewhat more precisely: operational coherence is a harmonious fitting-
together of elements and aspects of an activity, which is conducive to the 
successful achievement of the aims of that activity.  (Note to anyone intending to 
comment on this paper: do not quote this formulation, as it is far from 
satisfactory until the terms occurring in it receive more clarification and 
refinement).  Such coherence may consist in something as simple as the correct 
coordination of bodily movements needed in riding a bicycle, drinking a glass of 
water, or walking up the stairs (very difficult to achieve, as we have learned in 
contemporary robotics), or something as complex as what is involved in the 
integration of a range of material technologies and various abstract theories in 
the global positioning system (GPS).  In puzzling out what coherence is, it might 
be helpful to think about what happens when it is lacking.  If I try to drink water 
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by directing the glass to my nose, that is an incoherent activity.  When we do not 
heed the sign that warns “mind your step”, that rare moment of stumble reminds 
us how carefully and how well we normally maintain the coherence of our bodily 
movements in everyday life without even thinking about it.  Incoherence may be 
traceable to false beliefs (about where my mouth is, for example) or mutually 
contradictory beliefs, but ineptitude of belief is certainly not the only reason for 
incoherence.  It could also be due to the lack of capability (starting with simple 
lack of muscular strength or failure of eyesight), the use of inappropriate 
materials, poor timing between different operations, and so on. 
So much for intuitive illustrations: in order to make this notion of 
coherence workable, much more needs to be said about each part of the 
definition given above.  First of all, what do I mean by the “elements and aspects” 
of activities?  That was just loose talk.  There are many ways of analyzing how 
activities are constituted, and I am not equipped to enter into a full study of the 
ontology of actions in this paper.  For my present purposes at least, it makes 
sense to analyze an activity as made up of operations, as suggested above in my 
definition of epistemic activity.  Take a very simple activity, for example match-
lighting — so essential to the progress of chemistry, even physics, for many 
crucial decades!  I am starting with something basic, since the analysis quickly 
gets very complicated when we consider even a slightly more complex activity, 
such as weighing-with-a-balance.7   
Most people can probably bring up the memory of learning how to light a 
match, which actually takes a surprising degree of skill and coordination to do 
well.  With one hand I hold the matchbox steady and firm, with the rough strip 
facing my other hand; with the other hand I hold the match tightly, just so; I pull 
the head of the matchstick across the rough strip on the box (no, no, the correct 
move is to push it), at an appropriate angle and at the right speed; I stop the 
movement of that hand once the flame comes on.  These four operations have to 
come together well enough for the activity of match-lighting to be coherent.  This 
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is what was intended by “a harmonious fitting-together” in the rough-and-ready 
definition of operational coherence given above.  It is difficult to be more precise 
in characterizing this quality of harmony in inter-operational interactions, or to 
reduce it to another, better-understood notion.  We can go on listing synonyms: 
coordination, orchestration, concordance, back to coherence…  It may be best to 
take “harmony” (or “harmonious”) as a primitive in its meaning, and verifiable in 
the end only through the achievement of the aim of the activity. 
This brings me to the last part of the above definition of coherence: what 
do I mean when I say that coherence is “conducive to” the successful 
achievement of the aim of the activity?  (Or rather, I should simply say 
“conducive to the achievement…” since “successful achievement” is redundant, 
or perhaps just “conducive to its success” since “success” can only mean “the 
achievement of its aim”.)  To say “conducive to” actually fails to indicate precisely 
my thoughts on the relation between coherence and success, which will take 
some spelling out.  On the face of it, there are two possibilities: coherence and 
success just mean the same thing; or, coherence is the cause of success.  One 
strong reason against the former possibility is that a coherent activity may well 
fail, due to unforeseen circumstances (and an incoherent one may succeed 
occasionally by accident).  I may do all my operations correctly in attempting to 
light a match, but meet a sudden gust of wind, a mischievous friend pouring a 
bucket of water all over me, or any number of other possible mishaps.  We could 
say that the activity was not coherent if it did not take precautions against all of 
these possibilities, but that is not a palatable option.  Not only does it make it 
quite impossible for anyone ever to engage in a coherent activity, but it also 
makes coherence forever undetermined, as it depends on whether or not the 
innumerable “other circumstances” will come to obtain.  It is better to say that 
my match-lighting activity is coherent, but may occasionally be unsuccessful due 
to circumstances.  Then we would be saying that a coherent activity is successful, 
ceteris paribus.  Does that amount to saying that coherence is the cause, or rather 
a cause, of success?  There is some sense in that formulation. 
It is important to keep in mind that an “activity” is not a single act, not 
even an actual concrete happening.  Rather, it is a conceptualized thing, a type of 
action characterized by a description, not simply referred to by ostension.  Such 
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description is always abstract in the sense of not including all the features that 
real concrete entities (including actions) possess.  Which features to include in 
our description of an activity is a conventional decision, and there is no uniquely 
right way to identify and classify activities out of the barely differentiated stream 
of actions that we continually engage in, alone and with each other.  So, an 
activity, as such, is not precisely instantiated in our actual doings, and success 
can only be judged through how our actual doings work out.  A coherent activity 
makes sense in the realm of abstraction, but whether its actual execution is 
successful depends on all sorts of conditions.  This is responsible for the sense 
that coherence and success are not synonymous.   
The following, then, is my considered definition of operational coherence: 
an activity is operationally coherent if and only if there is a harmonious 
relationship among the operations that constitute the activity; the concrete 
realization of a coherent activity is successful, ceteris paribus; the latter condition 
serves as an indirect criterion for the judgement of coherence.   
I must stress that this is not what epistemologists usually mean by 
“coherence”, as operational coherence is irreducible to logical relations between 
statements.  In the most simple-minded version of the coherence theory of truth, 
coherence is taken to mean mere logical consistency within a set of statements.  
This is nothing short of a philosophical disaster, an invitation to vicious 
circularity and the most problematic kind of relativism; it eliminates any 
inherent link between knowledge and reality.  James O. Young (2015) notes that 
more plausible versions of the coherence theory take the coherence relation as 
“some form of entailment” or “mutual explanatory support between 
propositions.”  A similar thought to Young’s latter formulation is expressed by 
Richard Foley (1998, p. 157): "Coherentists deny that any beliefs are self-
justifying and propose instead that beliefs are justified in so far as they belong to 
a system of beliefs that are mutually supportive.”  But the problems of circularity 
and relativism remain in the idea of propositions rendering one another true by 
mutual support without anything else to ground any of them. 
In contrast, operational coherence cannot be achieved in an arbitrary 
fashion by decree, wishful thinking, or mere mutual agreement.  On the contrary, 
in order to do things successfully in the world, we need to have an understanding 
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and mastery of our surroundings.  It is operational coherence, not the mirage of 
correspondence, through which the mind-independent world is actually brought 
to bear on our knowledge.  Operational coherence carries within it the constraint 
by nature.  In fact, having cleared away the ungrammatical illusion of a direct 
correspondence between proposition and reality, we can see that operational 
coherence is the only way in which reality can enter our practices.8 
3. Coherence and the truth of propositions9 
Having spelled out the notion of operational coherence, I would now like 
to come to a more careful consideration of propositions and their truth.  We need 
to ask: if coherence is the property of an activity, how does it relate to truth, 
which is the property of a statement or a proposition?  This is a significant and 
difficult question, to which I will attempt an initial sketch of an answer here.  I 
want to start by building productively on the “pragmatic theory of truth” 
commonly attributed to William James.  This theory is widely regarded as 
absurd, which has also contributed to the unpopularity of pragmatism among 
tough-minded philosophers.  Here is probably the most notorious statement by 
James ([1907] 1978, p. 106): “’The true,’ to put it very briefly, is only the expedient 
in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our 
behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion . . .”   
I think James’s choice of the word “expedient” here was unfortunate, 
suggesting mere “convenience” or “usefulness”.  Let’s take the spirit of his 
statement more sympathetically.  What James is saying is that how we tell if a 
statement is true is by seeing if it works out in practice, and that there might not 
really be anything more to what it means for a statement to be true over and 
above how we tell that it is true.  The intuition is that the truth of a statement, 
say “The cat is on the mat”, consists in the conjunction of a myriad of facts: that I 
                                                        
8
 To help us think about operational coherence, I propose that we take Neurath’s boat, 
literally: "We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without 
ever being able to dismantle it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best 
components." (Neurath [1932/33] 1983, p. 92)  This is usually taken as a splendid 
coherentist metaphor for the fitting-together of propositions.  But we can see boat-
fixing as an activity illustrating the nature of operational coherence. 
9
 This section is a revised and expanded version of the discussion in Chang (2016), 
pp. 114–116. 
 12 
have a visual image of a cat sitting on a mat; that my friend standing next to me 
does, too; that when my friend goes to lift the cat off the mat she does find 
something furry, warm and wriggling in her hands; that a screeching meow 
issues from that creature; that my friend ends up with a scratch on her hands; 
that the vet recognizes the cat as my old cat and not some fake robot-cat; etc.  
That may be all there is to what we mean by the truth of the statement, if we set 
aside the metaphorical projection of correspondence to the inaccessible 
“external world” in which the “real cat” apart from all of our feline experiences 
maintains its ghostly existence comparable to Ryle’s “ghost in the machine”. 
Preserving James’s spirit but trying to avoid the obvious pitfalls, I want to 
propose a different formulation, in terms of operational coherence: A statement 
is true in a given circumstance if (belief in) it is needed in a coherent activity.10  For 
example, take the statement that the surface area of a sphere is proportional to 
the square of its radius.  This statement is needed in a whole array of coherent 
activities, ranging from figuring out the amounts of paint needed to paint balls of 
different sizes, to Immanuel Kant’s deduction of the inverse square law of 
gravitation.  So the statement in question is true in a wide range of 
circumstances.  Now I hasten to add some much-needed elaborations and 
qualifications concerning various parts of this definition of truth. 
(1) The definition above gives a sufficient condition for truth, but not a 
necessary condition (only “if”, not “only if”).  This may be considered a grave 
philosophical defect, as the usual ideal of a definition is to give a necessary and 
sufficient condition.  On the contrary, I think it is an advantage, inviting a more 
open-minded kind of philosophy.  Giving a sufficient condition for truth makes a 
concept that we can use.  Not giving a necessary condition allows that there may 
be other ways in which the concept is meaningful.  It may turn out, after much 
reflection, that we decide that there is no other useful sense of “truth”, but at 
least I am not inclined to pre-judge that issue. 
(2) The activity involved in the constitution of truth does not have to be 
that of explicit theory-testing (which would be the nearest activity-version of the 
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idea of a statement corresponding to the world).  Sometimes a statement is 
explicitly tested and confirmed, but other times its truth is shown in its 
involvement in the success of other kinds of activities.  The pertinent activities 
do not even have to fall under the rubric of “epistemic activities”, by which I 
mean activities that are explicitly intended to increase and improve knowledge. 
(3) Why I say “coherent” rather than “successful” in my definition should 
be clear from the meaning of coherence discussed in the last section.  Defining 
truth in terms of the coherence of activities removes it one step away from direct 
verification (which would be done in terms of success).  This may be unsatisfying 
at first glance, but it does make the notion of truth less closely tied to accidental 
successes and failures determined by case-by-case variations of fringe 
circumstances, which should be reassuring to those who worry that the James-
style pragmatic notion of truth is too capricious. 
(4) Requiring that (belief in) the statement in question should be 
“needed” in a coherent activity is designed to remove the worry that the 
statement might be involved in the activity in a superfluous way reminiscent of 
the tacking paradox or the Gettier problem (or employed in a purely fictional or 
instrumentalist manner).  What is involved here is not a logical necessity that we 
can reason out a priori, but a pragmatic necessity, which can only be learned 
empirically.  In other words, in the course of checking the truth of a statement, 
we ask: can the coherence of the activity be maintained, if we negate the 
proposition is question?  For example, we can perfectly well use Maxwell’s 
equations while denying that the ether exists, so we know that belief in the 
existence of the ether is not necessary in relation to the coherence of the activity 
of solving Maxwell’s equations (while it was necessary in Maxwell’s original 
activity of model-building, which led him to the equations in the first place).  
Checking for pragmatic necessity may not live up to some overblown image of a 
philosophical test, but it is how we get on in science, and in the rest of life, too.  
To the problem of suspected superfluous propositions, there is no magic 
solution.  As Clarence Irving Lewis (1930, p. 14) put it in his review of John 
Dewey’s The Quest for Certainty: “Salvation is through work; through 
experimental effort, intelligently directed to an actual human future.”   
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(5) If we base the notion of truth on pragmatic necessity, do we run the 
risk of turning it into a psychologistic concept?11  What if our mental make-up is 
such that belief in a certain fantastical proposition is psychologically necessary 
for us to carry out some activities?  If I can only swim by believing that I am a 
dolphin, is it true that I am a dolphin?  On the face of it, this seems like a 
straightforward and devastating objection to my notion of truth, or any 
pragmatist notion of truth.  But such alleged situations would need to be 
examined carefully.  If I can also do the swimming by believing that I am a seal, 
then the belief in dolphin-hood is not necessary.  If I can also do it by drugging 
myself rather than by relying on any beliefs about my identity, then no such 
beliefs are necessary.  Besides, if others can swim without believing themselves 
to be dolphins, then the belief in dolphin-hood is not something necessary for the 
generalized activity of swimming, but something peculiar to me.  But if we can 
imagine the case in which most people, no matter what they try, simply cannot 
swim without believing that they are dolphins (and therefore doing things like 
dolphins do), then we will need to consider whether we aren’t actually dolphins. 
(6) If truth is defined in terms of coherence, it has to be a matter of 
degree, and I think that is right.  As Austin noted ([1950] 1979, pp. 117, 130–
131), “very true”, “true enough”, etc. are perfectly sensible locutions, and it is 
unreasonable to try to reduce ordinary judgements of truth to yes/no.   Many 
philosophers of science, mostly in the course of trying to defend scientific 
realism, have already fallen into the habit of speaking about “approximate truth”; 
Richard Boyd (1990) has argued convincingly that it is not possible to maintain 
scientific realism without relying on approximate truth.  In order to escape this 
conclusion, perhaps one could say that “approximate truth” is an imprecise way 
of speaking, and what we are really talking about is approximation to the truth, 
while truth itself remains a yes-or-no matter.  But I do not see what would be 
gained in preserving binarity for truth in that way. 
(7) My definition only states what is true “in a given circumstance”, so 
truth comes attached with a specific scope (as well as coming in degrees).  But 
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 I thank Mike Martin for raising a version of this worry when the spoken version of 
this paper was given at the Aristotelian Society. The example he used was about 
overconfidence on the part of scientists. 
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this is also to say that we may attempt to extend the scope of the truth of a 
statement constituted in one activity, through the use of the same statement in 
other coherent activities.  A universal truth would be a statement that is true in 
all circumstances in which it can be applied.12  When we say that mere 
convenience should not be mistaken for truth, that is normally because “the 
truth will out”; that is, we should not say that a statement is “true” without 
qualification, if we expect that it might be shown not to be true in some other 
circumstances.  When we say “It may seem as if P were true in these 
circumstances, but P is actually not true”, what else can we be meaningfully 
asserting, other than that P is, or will be, shown to be false in some other 
circumstances?  James’s notorious definition of truth quoted above actually 
continues as follows, which tends to confirm my reading of him: “. . . and 
expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what meets expediently 
all the experience in sight won’t necessarily meet all farther experiences equally 
satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling over, and making us 
correct our present formulas.”  The last bit of James’s statement actually fits very 
well with my notion that operational coherence is the only way in which reality 
gives input into our knowledge.  And this gives operational-coherentist truth the 
mind-independence that realists value most in correspondence truth, while it is 
an “internal” notion meaningful within a system of practice, not without it.13 
A slightly extended example may usefully illustrate further how the 
operational-coherentist notion of truth works.  Take what was perhaps the single 
most important proposition in the history of organic structural chemistry in the 
19th century: “Carbon has valency 4”, meaning that it is capable of forming 4 
bonds with other chemical units (atoms or radicals).  This statement was needed 
in the successful working-out of numerous molecular structures.  It was also 
needed in the understanding and execution of substitution reactions.  For 
example, a body of methane gas (CH4) could be made to absorb a volume of 
chlorine gas and emit an equal volume of hydrogen gas, turning the methane into 
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disappointment, no matter how far we were to pursue our inquiries” (Misak 2007, p. 
68). 
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 Here I draw inspiration from Hilary Putnam’s “internal” or “pragmatic” realism; 
see Sosa (1993) for a convenient and insightful exposition. 
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chloromethane (CH3Cl); such a substitution could be made four times in total, in 
the end yielding carbon tetrachloride (CCl4).  Such successful instances, it is fair 
to say, indicate the truth of “Carbon has valency 4.”  But this truth was a limited 
one.  We know, for example, that the structure of carbon monoxide remained a 
mystery for a long time.  Even carbon dioxide was not trivial to understand, but it 
could be accommodated by saying that the carbon atom formed a double bond 
with each of the two atoms of oxygen (valency 2), thereby using up all of its 4 
bonding-potentials, as indicated by the graphic formula O=C=O.  But it was not 
clear at all how carbon monoxide (CO) could be understood. 
As far as I can see now, my operational-coherence theory of truth does 
not differ substantially from James’s pragmatist theory of truth freed from 
misunderstandings, or from Dewey’s notion of “warranted assertability”, or from 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s account of truth as presented by Cheryl Misak (2007).14  
According to all of these conceptions, if our use of a theory has led to successful 
outcomes and not as a result of any strange accident or coincidence as far as we 
can see, then we can and should say, modestly and provisionally, that the 
relevant statements made in this theory are “true” — in the same sense as we say 
that it is true that rabbits have whiskers and live in underground burrows.  This 
“truth” is operational and verifiable.  It is the same thing as empirical 
confirmation, taken in a broad sense.15  It is achievable, to various degrees, and 
its pursuit is clearly useful.  A statement being true will mean that it passes all 
the tests of correctness that we can apply.  “Is it true that there is an airport in 
Cambridge (the one in southeast England)?” (There is.)  We know exactly how to 
answer such a question, and how to double-check and triple-check the answer as 
needed, and under which circumstances to start doubting the statement.  As 
Putnam (1995, p. 10) put it succinctly, paraphrasing James: “Truth . . . must be 
such that we can say how it is possible for us to grasp what it is.” 
When my work is more extended and developed, it will also include a 
similar pragmatist characterization of the notion of “reality”, of which I will only 
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give a telegraphic summary here.16  The easiest way to see how operational 
coherence can also ground an operative notion of reality is to start with Ian 
Hacking’s “entity realism”: “If you can spray them, then they’re real.” (Hacking, 
1983, p. 23)  Concepts enabling successful activities deserve our realist 
confidence.  I propose a coherence theory of reality: a putative entity should be 
considered real if it is employed in a coherent activity that relies on its existence 
and its basic properties (by which we identify it).  This notion of reality (or real-
ness) might be written with a lowercase “r” in order to distinguish it from the 
idea of “Reality” that denotes the whole “world” as some transcendent existence. 
Like truth in my operational-coherentist conception, “small-r” reality comes in 
different degrees, and is defeasible, as it is based on coherence.17  According to 
this notion of reality, phlogiston or caloric or ether, within its own domain of 
successful use, is as real as tables and chairs and cats and dogs are in our daily 
lives.  When Hacking says that positrons are real, or when I say phlogiston is real 
(Chang 2012, chapters 1 and 4), the sense of it is that a specific part or aspect of 
the overall Reality is somehow being captured in our conception.  And this 
parsing-out of Reality into various real entities is crucial in any kind of cognitive 
activity.  If we cannot identify sensible parts (or aspects) of nature, we cannot 
say anything intelligible, make any kind of analysis, or engage intelligently with 
nature in any specific and directed way.  So we have no choice but to worry 
about whether we are able to do the parsing well, and a kind of entity realism is 
prior to any truth realism one might hope for.  But how can we ever tell whether 
we have done the parsing correctly?  Again, “salvation is through work” — we 
can never be absolutely sure, but we check, double-check, and try checking 
continually in new domains of phenomena. 
4. Words, deeds, and knowledge 
Why do we want a theory of knowledge?  I contend that it is in order to 
help us have more and better knowledge.  Then our theory of knowledge needs 
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 A slightly more extended account can already be found in Chang (2016), pp. 116–
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 C. I. Lewis (1929, chapter 7) employed this device of distinguishing “Reality” and 
“reality” for similar purposes. 
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to tell us something instructive about the processes through which knowledge is 
gained and improved.  This is the direction in which I have attempted to steer my 
own epistemological thinking (see especially Chang 2011a).  So, what have we 
learned in that regard from the consideration of operational coherence, and what 
do we still need to learn from it? 
One important issue that deserves fuller consideration is the precise 
relation between knowledge-as-information and knowledge-as-ability.  There 
are two distinct senses in which knowledge-as-ability is larger than knowledge-
as-information.  Firstly, I believe that Ryle was correct in saying: “knowledge-
how is a concept logically prior to the concept of knowledge-that”, and “knowing-
that presupposes knowing-how” (1945/46, pp. 4-5, and pp. 15-16); this notion is 
further articulated by Jennifer Hornsby (2007).  In the other direction, 
knowledge-as-information enters as an important contributing element in 
knowledge-as-ability.  Here is Ryle again (1945/46, 16): “effective possession of 
a piece of knowledge-that involves knowing how to use that knowledge, when 
required, for the solution of other theoretical or practical problems. There is a 
distinction between the museum-possession and the workshop-possession of 
knowledge.”  Put together these two aspects of the embedding of knowledge-as-
information into knowledge-as-ability, and we can begin to see belief in 
propositions as one particular aspect of knowledge, rather than its core or 
essence.  Knowledge-as-information may only be flickering moments in the 
continual creation and use of knowledge-as-ability, and propositional belief only 
occasional crystallizations in that flow of activity. 
These thoughts also point to a larger project of considering how verbal 
articulations aid life (see Polanyi 1958, chapter 5).  The consideration of belief 
and truth does not exhaust the role of articulation in knowledge and in 
intelligent life.  As Ryle (1945/26, 12) pointed out, the verbalizations that occur 
when we try to articulate the principles guiding our activities are in the 
imperative mood, not in the declarative/indicative.  Look to imperatives for the 
most obvious occasions for the correspondence between the verbal and the non-
verbal in life; the correspondence between what we say and what we do is what 
we really ought to concern ourselves with, rather than the imagined 
correspondence between the verbal and the transcendental.  The philosophical 
 19 
grammar18 of imperatives is an urgent task for philosophers of science trying to 
pay attention to scientific practice, and to pragmatists more generally.  And don’t 
we also need to pay similar attention to the philosophical grammar of 
interrogatives?  In making these considerations, we would do well to remember 
Austin’s caution ([1950] 1979, p. 131): “many utterances which have been taken 
to be statements … are not in fact descriptive …. It is simply not the business of 
such utterances to ‘correspond to the facts’ (and even genuine statements have 
other businesses besides that of so corresponding).” 
So, there is a great deal to do.  But for now, I hope I have shown that 
moving away from the narrowly propositional view of knowledge allows us to 
retool the notion of truth so that it becomes operable, and similarly with the 
notion of reality.  Thereby we can reclaim these key concepts for the use of 
people who are actually engaged in the production and improvement of 
empirical knowledge.  We live in the world, and knowledge is only meaningful 
from that perspective within the world.  It is a futile and pernicious philosophical 
dream to seek the God’s-eye view, to hope to find an “external” perspective from 
which we can tell the “real” shape of the world.  Roberto Torretti (2000, p. 114) 
blasts the “scientific realists” who believe “that reality is well-defined, once and 
for all, independently of human action and human thought,” yet “in a way that 
can be adequately articulated in human discourse.”  They hold that science aims 
to develop “just the sort of discourse which adequately articulates reality — 
which, as Plato said, ‘cuts it at its joints’ —, and that modern science is visibly 
approaching the fulfilment of this aim.”  Torretti confesses that he finds it 
difficult “to accept any of these statements or even to make sense of them.”  The 
notions of truth and reality are in fact perfectly meaningful in the phenomenal 
realm of representing and intervening, and they should stay in that realm.  
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